In two years, 72 people were detained in Israel on suspicion of spying for Iran. A third of them

In Israel, in just under two years—from July 2024 to May 2026—72 agents were identified who agreed to cooperate with Iranian intelligence. 24 of them are natives of former USSR countries who repatriated to Israel, or their children, as well as one Russian citizen who received a work permit in Israel. Thus, Russian-speaking immigrants accounted for 33% of those detained, which significantly exceeds the proportion of such people in the country's population—about 15%. This was noted by the Israeli media "Spektr".
In two years, 72 people were detained in Israel on suspicion of spying for Iran. A third of them

In two years, 72 people were detained in Israel on suspicion of spying for Iran. A third of them Over 72 agents cooperating with Iranian intelligence have been identified in Israel between July 2024 and May 2026, with 33% being Russian-speaking immigrants, a demographic that constitutes only 15% of the population. Recruiters target individuals through social media, often emphasizing their Russian origins and promising evacuation to Russia, typically starting with minor tasks before progressing to more serious criminal acts.

These recruits are often vulnerable due to difficulties adapting to life in Israel and financial struggles, making them susceptible to offers of money for tasks like graffiti or photographing buildings, which can escalate to requests for assassinations or terrorist acts.

Those detained face harsh prison conditions, with complaints of malnutrition, cold, sleep deprivation, and mistreatment, despite many of their alleged offenses being limited to activities like drawing graffiti or taking pictures of publicly visible locations.

  • 72 agents cooperating with Iranian intelligence were identified in Israel between July 2024 and May 2026.
  • 33% of these agents are Russian-speaking immigrants, significantly higher than their 15% share of the Israeli population.
  • Iran recruits agents via social media, promising evacuation to Russia and often starting with simple tasks like graffiti and photography.
  • Recruits are often vulnerable due to adaptation difficulties and financial needs.
  • Tasks can escalate from minor offenses to requests for assassinations or terrorist acts.
  • Detained individuals report harsh prison conditions, including alleged mistreatment and deprivation.
  • Examples include individuals tasked with photographing sensitive military installations like the Iron Dome control panel.
Write a comment